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RESPONSES
WHAT THE TWINS SAW
Paul F Campos*
Anthony Kronman's essay presents us with a fundamental question:
Does justice exist in some transcendent sense? Or is justice merely a
matter of taste (more specifically, a taste for power)? I take Kronman's
thesis to be that there is such a thing as 'Justice" in the Socratic-which
is to say the Platonic-meaning of the word. However, he emphasizes
that our knowledge ofjustice can never achieve the certainty available
within the realm of pure reason, most clearly manifested to us when we
apprehend the truths of mathematics and geometry.
Kronman thus defends the position of Gorgias, who holds that
rhetoric is an honorable art, precisely because the passions must be
engaged if men are to be inspired to right action. The uncertain
counsels of reason are by themselves insufficient to this task, because the
demands of justice are rarely as clear as the transcendent truths of
mathematics. The lawyer, Kronman argues, is the archetypal rhetori-
cian. Caught in that middle earth between the transcendent and the
merely sensual, he is neither a disinterested pursuer of the truth nor a
nihilistic worshipper of power. He is therefore emblematic of the
essential human condition, in a way that the pure philosopher and the
pure politician could never be.
Kronman's account of the situation seems to me to be on the whole
correct. In what follows, I will explore a few of the implications of this
view.
First, we might begin by noticing a certain assumption that is
routinely embedded in arguments about whether concepts like justice
have some sort of transcendent metaphysical status, as Socrates argues,
or are themselves merely rhetorical devices that are employed by those
who seek power for its own sake, as his opponent Callicles claims. This
assumption, which is rarely made explicit, nevertheless has a consider-
able influence on these sorts of metaphysical disputes. It is that, ifjustice
is not merely a matter of social convention and individual taste, we can
achieve certain knowledge of it. Or conversely, it is assumed that, if we
cannot achieve such objective knowledge of what justice is, it follows
that justice in the transcendent sense must be an illusion.
* Professor of Law and Director, Byron R. White Center for American Constitutional Study,
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Of course, neither of these conclusions is in any way logically entailed
by whatever beliefs we might have about the nature ofjustice. They are
in fact classic illustrations of the rationalist tendency to confuse the
epistemic with the ontological: to confuse our ability to know about a
thing with assertions about the existence of that thing.
This tendency is so pronounced in modem thought that it often gives
birth to metaphysical arguments of such a crude nature that it is difficult
to believe otherwise intelligent persons could make such claims. For
example, it is routinely argued that the universe must be assumed to be
a product of mindless and random material causes because the scientific
method is supposedly based on this assumption. Therefore, the
argument goes, any other assumption would be "unscientific."' This is
merely an extreme example of the intellectual axiom, "That which I do
not know is not knowledge." Because science cannot meaningfully delve
into first causes, it is asserted that the very idea of first causes is meaning-
less. Thus one gets what amounts to a series of ontological arguments
for the non-existence of God, but of a particularly confused and
disingenuous kind.
The motto of the typical contemporary intellectual could well be,
"Better to rule in Hell than to serve in Heaven," that is, better to know
one thing with certainty, even if that thing is that there is (ultimately)
nothing worth knowing. And, contrary to popular belief, the best
example of this intellectual tendency is not the dreaded cocktail party
nihilism of the academic postmodemist, but rather the dominant
philosophy of the modem age, which is of course utilitarianism in all its
many forms.
Indeed, Plato and Bentham remain the two possible roads to an
imperial certainty in metaphysical matters, which we might term the
geometric and the gastronomic. While Plato's gaze was forever fixed on
the eternal forms, Bentham's inquiries were limited to the stomach, and
related regions. One might even venture to assert that modern
economic theory, and especially the economic analysis of law, has
attempted to merge these two roads into a single epistemological
superhighway, as it attempts to reduce everything to a question of
gastronomy, and then to measure gastronomic matters with geometric
exactitude. Thus the rationalizing and conceptualizing tendencies of
Plato and his heirs have been wedded to the animalistic nihilism of
1. See, e.g., DANIEL DENNETr, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA (1995). For an extremely amusing
(and depressing) catalogue of similar lines of argument, seeJohn Searle's THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND
3-26 (1992).
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Callicles, to produce what in the modem university is often called
"science"--specifically social science.2
But what can we know of any transcendent realm beyond that in
which our appetites are measured with such exquisite precision by the
priests of rational self-interest? Here, Kronman's argument gives us a
hint as to where we might look. Kronman frames his argument by
employing a thought-provoking dichotomy between the passionless
truths of mathematics and the sensual pleasures of fine cooking. He
then argues persuasively that rhetoric occupies a middle ground
between these two forms of persuasion.
Unlike mathematics, rhetoric is concerned with truths that are
variable and obscure, and permanently subject to dispute, and it
employs the passions as instruments of persuasion. Unlike cooking,
it starts with the assumption that there are meaningful truths "about
the things that are just and unjust," and seeks to persuade others of
these truths by means of passions that are social rather than private in
nature. Gorgias's craft stands between mathematics and cooking, and
can neither be elevated to the one nor demoted to the other.
3
Again, this seems to me to be correct, subject to the following proviso: only
because of the limits of normal human perception, which divide reason from
emotion, and immanent enjoyment from transcendent knowledge. But what
of abnormal perception, enjoyed by those who lack even the rudiments of
what we usually consider to be the more sophisticated reasoning powers of the
human mind?
Philosophers have long considered mathematics to be the "queen of the
sciences." Mathematicians, in particular, have always had a keen sense of an
intimate connection between the ultimate nature of things and the mysterious
power of numbers. Pythagoras, who discovered the single most important
theorem in the history of mathematics, was himself the founder of a religious
cult whose central tenet was that "all things are numbers." And indeed it is
difficult to contemplate the mathematical symmetry of nature without feeling
the force of Plato's dictum that "God eternally geometrizes."
Why, for example, does the resistance of a body in water increase by
squares as its mass increases by cubes?4 Why aren't the relevant proportions
something apparently random, like forty-eight percent to seventy-one percent?
Why can you predict a baseball team's won-loss record with uncanny accuracy
by taking the ratio between the squares of their runs scored and runs allowed?5
Do not such examples (and there are an almost infinite supply of similar ones
2. As Searle notes, "anything that calls itself'science' probably isn't." JOHN SEARLE, MINDS,
BRAINS AND SCIENCE 9 (1984).
3. Se Anthony Kronman, Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 677,682 (1999).
4. This is why it is economical to employ supertankers.
5. This is just one of thousands of practical applications of the Pythagorean theorem.
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known to us) almost demand we accept the existence of some fundamental
connection between the abstract clarity of mathematics and the objective
"reality" of the material world?6
In his book, The Man Wo Mistook His Wife For A Hat, the neurologist Oliver
Sacks describes his encounters with two autistic twins, John and Michael.
Having measurable IQs of sixty, they had been institutionalized as severely
retarded and possibly psychotic idiots savants.' When Sacks first got to know
John and Michael, they were in their mid-twenties. It had already been
discovered that they had seemingly limitless documentary powers of recall:
They could describe in detail the most minute details of any day of their lives
since the age of four or so. They also possessed the ability to determine almost
instantaneously on which day of the week any date within an 80,000-year span
fell. To achieve this feat, researchers assumed the twins were employing some
unconscious calendrical algorithm. They were categorized as examples of the
mysterious but well-known phenomenon of otherwise mentally defective
individuals who were nevertheless capable of prodigious feats of calculation.
But Sacks was unsatisfied by this obviously inadequate "explanation." For
the twins seemed unable to perform even the simplest mathematical opera-
tions: "They cannot do simple addition or subtraction with any accuracy, and
cannot even comprehend what multiplication or division means. What is this:
'calculators' who cannot calculate, and lack even the most rudimentary powers
of arithmetic?" 8
One day, Sacks witnessed an incident that deepened the mystery. He
accidentally knocked a box of matches off a table, causing the matches to spill
out onto the floor. Almost simultaneously, each twin said "111." Then John
said "37." Michael repeated this. Then John said "37" again. Sacks
laboriously counted the matches, and discovered that there were indeed 111.9
This seemed remarkable enough; but how did the twins manage tofactor that
number so readily? Sacks was both puzzled and disturbed by the incident, but
it seemed inexplicable. So he forgot about it ("that which we do not know is
not knowledge").
The incident that eventually reminded him of this first mysterious
encounter ought to be related in Sacks's own eloquent words:
This second time they were seated in a comer together, with a
mysterious, secret smile on their faces, a smile I had never seen before,
enjoying the strange pleasure and peace they now seemed to have. I
crept up quietly, so as not to disturb them. They seemed to be locked
in a singular, purely numerical, converse. John would say a number
6. What better example could there be of the mindless materialism of contemporary intellectual
life than the almost unconscious assumption that something is "real" precisely to the extent that it is an
object?
7. See OuVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK His WIFE FOR A HAT 195-213 (1985).
8. Id. at 197.
9. Films buffs may recall how this incident was essentially reproduced in a scene between Dustin
Hoffman and Tom Cruise in the film "Rain Man."
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-a six-figure number. Michael would catch the number, nod, smile,
and seem to savour it. Then he, in turn, would say another six-figure
number, and now it wasJohn who received, and appreciated it richly.
They looked, at first, like two connoisseurs wine-tasting, sharing rare
tastes, rare appreciations....
What were they doing? What on earth was going on? ..
As soon as I got home I pulled out tables of powers, factors,
logarithms and primes . . . I already had a hunch-and now I
confirmed it. All the numbers, the six-figure numbers, which the twins had
exchanged were primes .... 1o
The next day Sacks joined the twins in their game, and (by surrepti-
tiously glancing at a hidden book) was soon trading eight and nine-figure
primes with his delighted patients. Eventually the twins moved on to
swapping twenty-figure primes, or at least Sacks assumed that is what
they were doing, as there were no books available in 1966 that went
beyond even ten figures when listing prime numbers. Indeed, even a
sophisticated computer program would have had difficulty producing
such a computation because, as Sacks emphasizes, there is no simple
method, algorithmic or otherwise, for calculating primes.
There is no such method, and yet these twins, who were incapable of
adding 12 and 17 correctly, were somehow capable of performing a feat
of unaided calculation that far exceeded the abilities of the greatest
mathematicians. Furthermore, Sacks's account makes clear that they
seemed to derive a keen aesthetic and even sensual pleasure from their
numerical games.
Sacks goes on to speculate that the twins could somehow "see"
numbers in all their Platonic purity, that indeed for these severely
retarded young men the universe in some sense actually consisted of
numbers. Sacks's account can be understood to imply that the twins
may have grasped the essential relationships between numbers-and
thus perhaps the underlying rational structure of reality-in some
fundamental way that remains inaccessible to persons of normal
intelligence. And they seemed to do so not merely in regard to the sorts
of numerical relationships we already understand (primes, factors,
powers, etc.): "I observed them in countless other sorts of number
games or number communion, the nature of which I could riot ascertain
or even guess at."' 1
"Plato thought nature but a spume that plays
Upon a ghostly paradigm of things;
10. SACKS, supra note 7, at 201-02.
11. IAL at 204.
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Solider Aristotle played the taws
Upon the bottom of the king of kings;
World-famous golden-thighed Pythagoras
Fingered upon a fiddle-stick or strings
What a star sang and careless Muses heard ..... 2
The observations of scientists such as Sacks suggest that Kronman's
division of rational knowing and sensual enjoyment, which applies so
well to we ordinary mortals, may merely be a product of our mental and
sensual limitations. Could it be that the twins are "naturals" in the
medieval sense of that word? That, precisely because of their otherwise
defective intelligences, they can see almost instantaneously what the rest
of us can only derive through the most cumbersome calculation?
Perhaps, in their numerical communion, they taste the perfect knowl-
edge of mathematics in much the same way (but with much greater
intellectual and sensual intensity) that we taste the handiwork of an
accomplished cook.
It could be that the twins, and those like them, illustrate how what we
call "reason" is no more than a shadowy substitute for true insight into
the nature of things. The details of Sacks's narrative strongly suggests
that Michael and John achieved some sort of mystical union with the
essence of numbers themselves, in a way that we, who long ago saw
whatever glimpse we had of such visions fade into the light of common
day, can only dimly imagine. For these severely retarded twins,
profound insight into the most abstract truth was wedded to a kind of
sensual ecstasy.
And what of lawyers? They remain where Kronman places them:
in the ambiguous realm of rhetoric, enjoying within the context of their
professional role neither the transcendent knowledge of absolute truth,
nor the visceral pleasures of sensual satisfaction. They are what William
Ian Miller has called "moral menials"-those who are required by the
necessities of politics and power to "deal with moral dirt, or... to get
morally dirty [when doing] what the polity needs them to do."' 3 As
Kronman puts it, "theirs is a dirty business.""
Yet in a sense, Sacks's twins remind us that even those who seem to
carry out society's most menial roles may harbor a secret knowledge
about the nature of things. Humble Gorgias, so easily dismissed by the
priests of philosophy and power, may have glimpsed the true ambiguity
12. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, Among School Children, in SELEcTED POEMS AND TWO PLAYS OF
WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, 116-17 (M.L Rosenthal ed., 1962).
13. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 184 (1997).
14. Kronman, supra note 3, at 709.
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of the ordinary human condition. And it is licit to imagine that
lawyers-derided as unethical mouthpieces whose opinions can be
bought and sold, and subjected to countless jokes about their moral
character-have seen truths that remain hidden from those who need
not struggle with the moral quandaries inherent in doing society's legal
and political dirty work.

